Criminal Background Check
Performance Audit

Delmar School District
Kathleen K. McGuiness, RPh, CFE
Delaware State Auditor

Why This Engagement? This engagement was conducted in accordance with 29 Del. C. § 2906 and evaluated the district’s compliance with state laws and regulations regarding criminal background checks required for all district employees, contractors, volunteers, and student teachers.

Our performance audit had two objectives:

(1) Determine if the district complied with state laws and regulations for criminal background checks on all required employees, contractors, volunteers, and student teachers, and
(2) Assess the district’s internal controls and determine if the controls have been properly employed to reduce the risk of harm to district students.

This report is intended to assist district management with recommendations to improve procedures, processes, and internal controls as necessary.

What Was Found? We found the district could strengthen its internal controls in several ways, including by improving documentation to ensure the following:

(1) Employees, contractors, volunteers, and student teachers are cleared, certified, and suitable for their positions in accordance with state laws and regulations, and
(2) Employee, contractor, volunteer, and student teacher files contain the requisite documentation to provide evidence of the district’s compliance with relevant state laws, regulations, and policies.

The report contains several recommendations for improvement, which we encourage district management to consider implementing. These recommendations were developed based on evaluation of audit evidence obtained for not only this school district but also all districts across the state, and they are designed to help keep schoolchildren safer by improving internal controls related to certifying the criminal background check processes.

The Delmar School District Criminal Background Checks Performance Audit for 2014 through 2019 can be found on our website: click here.

Please do not reply to this email. For any questions regarding the attached report, please contact State Auditor Kathleen K. McGuiness at Kathleen.Mcguiness@delaware.gov.
To the Delmar School District:

The attached report provides the results of our performance audit on compliance with criminal background checks for the Delmar School District, including employees, volunteers, contractors, and student teachers, in accordance with the criteria set forth in the Delaware Code. The scope of this audit was January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2019.

My office is authorized, under 29 Del. C., Ch. 29, §2906 to perform postaudits of all state agencies. The district’s management is responsible for criminal background checks, internal controls, and compliance with applicable Delaware Code.

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with the standards applicable to performance audits contained in Government Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

This report can be accessed online through the State Auditor’s website at http://auditor.delaware.gov.

Sincerely,

Kathleen K. McGuiness, RPh, CFE
State Auditor

December 14, 2021
Table of Contents

Audit Authority ........................................................................................................................................... 1
Background .................................................................................................................................................. 1
Audit Objectives ......................................................................................................................................... 4
Audit Scope ................................................................................................................................................... 4
Audit Methodology ....................................................................................................................................... 5
Audit Results ................................................................................................................................................ 6
Schedule of Findings, Recommendations, and Responses ................................................................. 7
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 16

Abbreviations:

CBC  Criminal Background Check
DELJIS  Delaware Criminal Justice Information System
DHR  Department of Human Resources
DELDOT  Delaware Department of Transportation
DOE  Department of Education
DSCYF  Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation
FSF  First State Financials
AOA  Office of Auditor of Accounts
PHRST  Payroll Human Resources Statewide Technology
SBI  State Bureau of Identification
SD  School District

The mission of the Delaware Office of Auditor of Accounts

The Delaware State Auditor serves Delawareans by providing independent objective oversight of the state government’s use of taxpayer dollars with the goal of deterring fraud, waste and abuse through unbiased assessments, including the use of various audits, special reports, and investigations of financial operations designed to ensure statutory compliance while enhancing governmental economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

For further information on this release please contact:

Kathleen K. McGuiness, RPh, CFE
kathleen.mcguiness@delaware.gov
Audit Authority

OAOA is authorized, under 29 Del. C., Ch. 29, §2906 to perform postaudits of all state agencies. Therefore, OAOA is authorized to conduct postaudits of the Department of Education and its School Districts including financial expenses, internal controls, and compliance associated with obtaining and reviewing criminal background checks for employment purposes.

Background

Overview

Criminal Background Checks (CBCs) and reference checks are an employer’s principal means of securing information about potential hires from sources other than applicants themselves. A CBC involves determining whether an applicant may be unqualified for a position due to a record of criminal conviction or other misrepresentation. The top reasons to conduct CBCs include mandates by law/regulations, to protect children from harm, to improve the quality of hires, and to protect the employer’s reputation. Public schools must follow certain protocols in obtaining CBCs in the hiring process. The protocols incorporate legal issues and protections due to the State’s commitment to nondiscriminatory employment practices.

Laws and Regulations

The State of Delaware and the Delaware Department of Education have addressed laws and regulations that require fingerprinted CBCs for prospective employees, contractors, volunteers and student teachers during the employment (hiring) process to help ensure the safety of children.

Title 31 §309 of the Delaware Code governs the requirement for CBCs for child-serving entities such as public schools and employees of the Department of Education. Title 31 §309 also addresses criminal activity preventing employment in child-serving entities, including felony convictions involving physical or sexual assault crimes, other violent felonies, misdemeanor convictions against children, and the prohibition requirements.

Delaware Title 14 of the Delaware Administrative Code §745 Public School Related Employment and §746 Student Teacher Placement detail CBC regulations, including purpose, definitions, procedures, and length of a valid CBC, as well as exemptions for continuous employment, appeals, confidentiality, penalties, and subsequent criminal history. Delaware law prevents individuals who have been convicted of crimes related to children – including child abuse (sexual and otherwise), neglect, kidnapping, and other violent crimes – from working in a Delaware school district.

Delmar School District Board of Education and Management

The main goal of public schools is to provide students with a challenging and safe learning environment. Meeting this goal requires the public school to hire qualified staff who ensure the safety and protection of the children. The Delmar School Board has a Board of Education that acts as the governing body of the school district, with oversight of educational affairs such as employment practices, compliance with laws and regulations, and approval of policies. The board consists of five elected officials who each serve five-year terms. Suitability is determined by the board approval letters and the receipt of an employment contract for the school district’s new hires. District management is responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective internal control structure.
Delmar Characteristics (Quick Facts)

Delmar School District, located in Sussex County, operates 5th - 12th grade schools with 1,377 students in 2 schools as of FY2021. Delmar School District employs 192 employees to educate and support its students as of FY2021. Other groups supporting the school district include student teachers, volunteers and contractors. The employees responsible for the CBC process in the school district are the Superintendent, Human Resources Assistant/District Secretary and Finance Coordinator.

Delmar Criminal Background Check Practices

As part of the application for public-school-related employment, the contract for services, or the volunteer agreement, candidates sign a Release for Criminal Background Check Information form approved by the Department of Education. Before beginning work, all prospective employees, student teachers, volunteers, and contractors are required to obtain a fingerprinted CBC completed by the Delaware State Police State Bureau of Identification (SBI) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). A public school may place a candidate in a position provisionally in accordance with Delaware Code; however, the candidate must comply with the provisions defined in the regulation. The Delmar School District stated that the district does not permit the employee to begin working until the CBC is received. Additionally, applicants with disqualifying offenses would not be hired in the first place, and the District does not accept out-of-state background checks. Final candidates for employment, or those who enter into a contract for services, may have a CBC from other states accepted if certain conditions defined in the regulations are met. The SBI CBC report shows any criminal activity that occurred in Delaware, and the FBI report shows any criminal activity nationwide. Delaware Code allows that if there is prohibited criminal activity history, the employment offer may be rescinded prior to employment, or employment may be terminated.

SBI provides the state with a central repository for the collections and accurate organization of criminal arrest records, crime report(s), and missing persons reports for Delawareans using the DELJIS system. The Delaware State Police front desk operations provide fingerprinting services for individuals requiring a criminal background history check for employment. The potential employee is required to provide photo identification, such as a valid driver’s license or state ID (from any state), but is not required to provide a Social Security number or birth certificate. The Delaware SBI Criminal History Section is responsible for the research and completion of criminal history background checks, which are titled “State of Delaware Certification of Criminal Background Check.” The Delaware SBI Criminal History Section also electronically submits a request for a federal CBC to the FBI, which provides the “FBI Criminal Background Check Civil Applicant Response.”

SBI mails the CBCs directly to the designee that the school district has appointed to receive the hard copy of the CBC documentation. The SBI and FBI CBCs are submitted to the school district Human Resources department and superintendent for review. The school district reviews the CBCs for any prohibitions (offenses) that may endanger its students and makes the required determination of suitability for employment based on the laws and regulations and any other criteria the public school may establish. Once reviewed and determined suitable by Human Resources and the Superintendent, the CBC package is presented to the board for final determination. In more complex criminal history background check cases, the school district will contact its attorney for legal guidance.

If the applicant is a student teacher, SBI mails the CBCs directly to the applicant’s higher education institution, and the institution’s Human Resources/Administrator of Educator Preparation Program makes the initial determination for suitability for placement in the school district. Once suitability is determined by the higher education institution, background checks are sent to the school district, where the final
determination of suitability occurs. The Delmar School District states that it does not accept student teachers for placement prior to receiving their background checks.

The school district is responsible for confidentiality, proper security precautions (including locked, fireproof cabinets), and record retention of the CBCs as part of the Human Resources employee personnel files. The Delmar School District does not use the CBC complete date field in the Payroll Human Resources Statewide Technology (PHRST) system. Each personnel file contains a checklist for the tracking of the applicant’s CBC and all supporting documentation. All applicants return a CBC submission receipt to the school district, which is placed in the employee file with the CBC when it is received.

The CBC is valid for twelve (12) months; however, if the employee becomes continuously employed by a Delaware public school, the background check is required to be kept on file for a minimum of five (5) years by the Delaware public school. Each person who has been continuously employed in a Delaware public school is exempt from obtaining a new CBC. Higher education entities dispose of the student teacher CBC no earlier than six (6) months after students graduate from the entity.

The State of Delaware and Delaware Department of Education do not require that periodic CBC reports be obtained throughout employment/service with the school district. However, the DELJIS system has an automated process to notify the school district/DOE regarding persons who have new activity on their criminal record after completion of the initial CBC process. The automated process helps ensure that persons serving vulnerable populations, such as children in schools, remain fit to serve.
Audit Objectives

In accordance with the provisions of the Delaware Code and Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards, we have conducted a performance audit of certain aspects of the CBC process to confirm the district has effectively used resources to ensure the safety of district children. The audit focused on the functions of the Delmar School District, the SBI, and the FBI. The Delmar School District is the entity primarily responsible for management of the CBC process for its employees, student teachers, volunteers, and contractors. SBI serves as the state’s repository for CBC information. The FBI is the national repository for CBC information.

The objectives established for the performance audit include:

- Determine if the school district is compliant with performing CBCs on covered personnel (Employees, Volunteers, Contractors, Student Teachers) and updating the background checks with subsequent criminal history as required under Delaware Administrative Code [14 Del. Admin. C. §745 and §746]. This also includes the completion of the final determination of suitability for the Public School.

- Assess the school district’s internal control structure to determine if it is designed to provide reasonable assurance for CBC objectives and make recommendations, as considered necessary. For example, this includes determining if the Board Policy and school district procedures that implement laws and regulations are clear, complete, and actionable.

Audit Scope

The scope of the engagement covered personnel data during the period January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2019.
Audit Methodology

The audit relied on various sources and methods to obtain an understanding of and assess Delaware’s CBC process for the Delmar School District. As such, we performed the following:

A. reviewed the applicable sections of Delaware Code and the Delaware Administrative Code to learn about the legal requirements pertaining to CBCs.

B. examined the adequacy of the 1) current regulatory requirements related to current covered personnel; 2) types of background checks; and 3) types of criminal convictions that preclude applicants from employment

C. conducted interviews and discussion with school district personnel to ascertain and document background check processes, practices, internal controls, limitation, and performance.

D. reviewed the Delmar School District Board policy to determine the existence and adequacy of the policy on CBCs information and requirements.

E. reviewed information recorded in PHRST for employees, including but not limited to information such as the hire/start date and history of employment.

F. conducted testing of covered personnel including employees, volunteers, student teachers, and contractors to verify compliance, using sampling to support our audit work. Testing included the following:

a. examining and scrutinizing SBI and FBI CBCs for the following:
   i. existence: obtaining CBC to confirm complete and compliant fingerprinted CBC from the Delaware SBI CBC and FBI CBC was received;
   ii. fraud indicators: reviewing for any fraud indicators, including matching to actual sampled person and inquiry/verification of any name changes;
   iii. timeliness: requesting CBC prior to hire to confirm the timeliness of receipt of CBC documentation by the school district;
   iv. record retention: retaining CBC to confirm adequate record retention of the SBI and FBI CBC information; and
   v. suitability determination: to determine that evidence of suitability form or other alternative documentation was completed to document the approval of the applicant for hire by the school district.

b. examining the SBI and FBI CBCs in detail when criminal activity was reported and comparing the criminal activity to what was prohibited under Delaware Code, to ensure disqualified candidates have not been hired by the school district.
Audit Results

The OAOA noted internal control and compliance deficiencies related to the following:

- The school district was not fully compliant with all requirements of the CBC State laws and regulations and did not have adequate processes and internal controls to address CBCs.
- The school district has incomplete policies and lacks written procedures on CBCs.

Refer to the Findings in the Schedule of Findings, Recommendations and Responses for details of the deficiencies identified and related recommendations.
**Schedule of Findings, Recommendations, and Responses**

**Finding Number:** 2019.01  
**Finding Name:** Criminal Background Checks

**Condition/Context**  
Although the school district had established processes and internal controls for CBCs, it was not fully compliant with all the requirements of the CBC State laws and regulations. Further, the district did not always have adequate processes and internal controls to address areas where the laws and regulations were vague or not fully defined.

- **Suitability Determination Key Control Evidence Documentation:** From a random sampling of 32 persons (employees, student teachers, and volunteers) for which CBC records were received for testing during the audit fieldwork, none received had documented evidence of the completion of the determination of suitability with the CBC records provided. The suitability determination includes: the name of the authorized person performing the review, the date of the suitability determination review, the decision, and, when there is a denial, the documentation of the reason for the denial. We understand the school district process does not include having the Human Resources Assistant/District Secretary and the Superintendent physically document the completion of management’s determination of suitability for the CBC before providing the CBC package to the Board of Directors for their final approval as a new hire, volunteer, or student teacher.

Following the exit meeting, the school district indicated in communications that it relies on other hiring documentation as evidence to support documentation of suitability determination. The school district provided six (6) copies of employment contracts, eighteen (18) School Board approval letters, two (2) emails, and six (6) initial payroll reports. A review of these documents found some documents provided evidence that the actual CBC records had not yet been received by the school district (7 Board Letters and 4 Employment Contracts). Other documents did not specifically reference a suitability determination (payroll records for 6 employees and emails for 2 student teacher persons). However, in cases where a Board Letter was provided there was a reference to actual board actions on specific dates. We then took an additional step to a review a sample of Board meeting minutes. These meeting minutes noted approval or sometimes noted pending receipt of CBC but in other cases did not document that the CBC was pending (inconsistent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person Type</th>
<th>Number Sampled</th>
<th>Suitability Documentation or Other</th>
<th>Exceptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student Teachers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 Inadequate Documentation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5 Adequate Documentation</td>
<td>18 Inadequate Documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3 Adequate Documentation</td>
<td>3 Inadequate Documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explicitly:
- The requirement states “The Public School, in accordance with 31 Del. C. §309(e), shall make a determination of suitability as an Employee, Contractor or Volunteer on each person it requested to initiate the CBC process.”
Delaware Code requires each public school to “...make the final determination of suitability for placement of a candidate in a Student Teaching Placement in its school.”

- **CBC Record Retention/Existence:** Two (2) volunteers did not have documented evidence that a compliant CBC, consisting of the fingerprint DE SBI and FBI screenings, had been completed.

- **Real-Time Start and End Date Tracking:** OAOA was unable to determine the timeliness of the receipt of the CBCs it sampled and tested, including three (3) student teachers and six (6) volunteers, due to the lack of real-time tracking of the individuals’ start and end dates. Without an established, documented real-time tracking process, there is no assurance that the appropriate persons have the required CBCs. The school district did provide some dates but not full start and end dates for all persons sampled.

- **Contractor Oversight and Non-Compliance:** There is no written requirement at either the State or district level (either in the Delaware Code or as part of school district internal controls) for oversight of outside contractors.

**Criteria**

- Title 31 §309 of the Delaware Code
- Title 14 Delaware Administrative Code, Section 745 & 746
- Budget and Accounting Manual Chapter 2 – Internal Controls

**Causes**

- Where the Delaware Code and Delaware Administrative Code are silent regarding certain aspects of the CBC requirements, standardized policies, procedures, and processes were not developed by the school district.
- The school district did not employ adequate information system software to track and manage CBCs for volunteers, student teachers, and contractors.
- The school district did not consistently follow processes to ensure that compliant CBCs were requested, received, reviewed, and filed, indicating a weakness in internal controls.
- Supervisory review failed to detect noncompliance with state laws and regulations regarding CBCs.
- The school districts function as independent entities, and DOE is not responsible for coordinated oversight. This may have caused or contributed to different approaches, used across school districts, for managing the CBC processes and inconsistency in the implementation of state laws and regulations across all school districts.

**Effect**
The school district was not in full compliance with state law and regulations for CBCs. The inability to verify all CBCs risks exposing children to potential harms from which they should be protected. Additional risks include the legal risk that results from potentially employing an unscreened individual in the school district (a negligent hiring claim), and reputation risk for the Delmar School District and the Department of Education as a whole.

**Recommendation**
We recommend the Human Resources Assistant/District Secretary take the following actions to help strengthen internal controls and compliance:
Work with other school districts and the Department of Education to determine the feasibility of implementing one information system that school districts can use to fully track and manage background check data and employment/services status for all persons employed, as follows:

- Explore the use of the PHRST system to track all persons (employees, contractors, volunteers, and student teachers) requiring CBCs as a cost-beneficial solution and;
  - determine if a person (other than a state employee) who requires a CBC, can be set up in PHRST as a non-payroll individual,
  - follow up with monthly automated reports from the PHRST system for the school district to track the status of CBCs;
  - determine if alternative systems exist which could be used for managing CBCs. For example, there are volunteer management systems which could assist with managing volunteers.
- Consider migrating from the current spreadsheet approach, used as a tracking mechanism, to an automated database solution with reporting functionality for tracking employees, contractors, volunteers and student teachers.

Review and update the design of internal controls to achieve the compliance objectives relating to CBCs. This should include the consideration of the use of information systems to help with tracking and monitoring CBCs and the documentation of internal controls over CBCs. Note: The general practice in reviewing and testing internal controls is that if it is not documented, it did not occur.

- Develop a working risk and control matrix to document the school district’s updated control process on CBCs. Use the matrix to review and monitor the design and operational effectiveness of controls on an ongoing basis and adjust the internal control design as needed as the environment changes.
- Develop a monitoring process to ensure CBCs are being obtained and reviewed, and that suitability determinations are being documented, following proper record retention and security policies.
- Communicate to DOE any areas of the regulations which should be updated, clarified, or changed. Where the Delaware Code or Delaware Administrative Code lack definitive guidance on a situational basis, the School District should request that DOE provide guidance by a written policy update that complies with the principles of the law to assist with the formation of district procedures.

Address the compliance findings in this report as follows:

- Take action to maintain a complete and accurate list or report of all persons who require an SBI/FBI fingerprinted CBC going forward.
- Review and address the compliance exceptions noted by OAOA and take actions as deemed appropriate to meet the requirements in the state laws and regulations. This should include, at a minimum, addressing any missing CBC records and reviewing the requirements for managing student teachers’ CBC records and suitability determinations.
- Consider whether other persons not sampled by OAOA should be reviewed for complete and compliant criminal background records.
- Evaluate whether the school district should audit its contractors’ compliance with the SBI/FBI fingerprinted CBC requirements for all their employees who work in the school district or if alternative vendor oversight of these contractors should occur.
Finding Number: 2019.02  
Finding Name: Policy and Procedures

Condition/Context
The school district did not have a Board Policy addressing CBC but did provide (after the exit meeting) a Hiring Policy with a last revision date of October 15, 1996. The Hiring Policy includes sections on First Considerations, Announcements, Applications, Screening Procedures, Interview, Non-Professional Position, and All Positions.

The school district’s 1996 hiring policy does not specifically address aspects of the CBC. The district utilizes a checklist for new hires and volunteers, which is also not referenced by its 1996 hiring policy. The school district did not have other written procedures for controlling the CBC process.

Criteria
- Control Environment - A Vital Part of Internal Controls: The oversight body should oversee the entity’s internal controls system, including the design, implementation, and operation of an internal controls system.
- Internal Controls Guidance: Internal controls – actions taken by the board to mitigate oncoming and anticipated risks – must be commensurate with risks mitigated. Management objectives include the effectiveness and efficiency of operations; reliability of reporting for external or internal use; and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Specifically, control activities are the policies and procedures that mitigate risks that hinder the completion of objectives. Control activities are an integral part of an entity’s planning, implementation and achievement of effective results, as well as its stewardship of government resources.
- Internal Controls Documentation: Documentation is required for the effective design, implementation, and operational effectiveness of an entity’s internal control system.

Causes
- The school district is responsible for establishing strong internal controls over the CBC process, using guidance such as the “Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government” (Green Book / COSO) as defined in the State of Delaware’s Budget and Accounting Manual (BAM). However, the school district has not designed internal controls to include comprehensive written policies and procedures addressing the CBCs, nor has it conducted a review of the current internal controls design and operational effectiveness.
- There is a lack of detailed direction within the Delaware Code on how the CBC process should be conducted. This lack of direction makes it difficult to fully develop comprehensive policy and procedures. DOE has not provided specific guidance to school boards with respect to governance and internal controls. Guidance from the DOE could be helpful in providing detailed direction where the Delaware Code is silent or insufficient.

Effect
The school district has not designed internal controls based on Green Book guidance to fully meet the objectives of CBC state law and regulation. Because the regulations are vague and open to interpretation, we are unable to verify if the district’s background check process satisfies Delaware law and the Delaware Department of Education’s regulations as intended. This increases the risk of abuse to the children who are students of the district.

Recommendation
We recommend that the Delmar School District Board of Education take the following actions to improve governance:

Schedule of Findings, Recommendations, and Responses
- Update and expand the board policy to add elements specific to the CBCs and internal control responsibilities.
- Schedule an annual review of board policies.

We recommend the Delmar School District Chief Operating Officer take the following actions to improve internal controls and consider collaborating with other school districts with similar issues as part of a task force to leverage resources within the 19 school districts to address these issues:

- Develop and document clear, consistent, and detailed procedures for the CBC process for employees, student teachers, volunteers, and contractors. Policies and procedures should be reviewed and updated periodically, or as needed. In addition, the district should develop and use a standardized form for documenting the suitability determination.
Management Response

DELMAR SCHOOL DISTRICT
Delaware's True "Neighborhood School!"
200 North Eighth Street • Delmar, Delaware 19940
Phone (302) 846-9544 • Fax (302) 846-2793

TO: Kathleen K. McGuiness, RPh, CFE
Auditor of Accounts

FROM: Charity Phillips
Superintendent

DATE: December 14, 2021

SUBJECT: Management Response to Criminal Background Check Performance Audit

Delmar School District considers Title 31 §309 of Delaware Code and Title 14 §§745 and 746 of the Delaware Administrative Code to be the bare minimum by which a school district would protect students. Delmar exceeds those requirements as any good steward of children would do by, among other things, performing documented reference checks, interviewing witnesses, following up on oddities, and speaking with prior supervisors, none of which are required by law. This is not just policy; it is best practice. A cursory audit during a pandemic conducted by myriad auditors due to extraordinary auditor turnover who clearly did not understand the process, does not change the fact that Delmar, like its sister districts throughout Delaware, meets and exceeds the procedural requirements of Delaware law. That we do not retain background checks from seven or more years ago for long term employees is not an indication that anything needs to change in our effort to protect children.

This exercise revealed no one hired in Delmar who should not have been hired. This process did not uncover a single employee hired who should have been disqualified, despite all its time, effort and expense.

We are of course frustrated with the findings, specifically that there are two of them, and that they are the same. In other words, one purported finding was reworded to make it appear as if there were two infractions, when in reality, the Auditor of Accounts’ office simply found one alleged infraction— not having procedures that it believes comply with the statute and regulations. We do have and abide by such procedures, and we disagree with the performance audit for many reasons, including those below.

Summary of Errors/Inaccuracies

1. The section entitled “Delmar School District Criminal Background Check Practices” is incorrect in multiple regards. While we are permitted by code to hire an employee pending a background check, we do not do so. Rather, we wait until
a "clear" background check is received. We go above and beyond. Thus, the statement in the report that employment may be terminated if there is criminal history is inaccurate. People with disqualifying offenses would not be hired in the first place. Delmar also does not accept out of state background checks, as stated in the report. Delmar also does not accept student teachers for placement prior to receiving their background checks.

2. We were found to have employees, contractors, volunteers and student teachers without records or with purged records. The audit did not mirror the regulatory requirement to maintain criminal background check records only for five years. Delmar employees tend to be longer term employees.

3. We are accused of not having a suitability analysis conducted for 32 employees, despite the fact we do not hire employees until after their clean background check is received. We are unable to understand how the requirement to fill out a form that says a person has a clean background check whenever we receive a clean background check, would better protect children. Anything further is bureaucratic waste.

4. It is stated in the report that three of our student teachers had "documentation exceptions." On September 22, 2021, we provided the Auditor’s Office with documentation showing that all three student teachers had clean background checks. This was ignored.

5. It is stated that among our 23 sampled employees, 5 had "some type of documentation" and 18 had "documentation exceptions." This is inconsistent with the initial report from the Auditor’s Office in September. In September, there was no discussion of 23 alleged issues. Rather, then, we were told three employees did not have a suitability determination. We explained that in the first and second cases, we did not need to have a criminal background check since the employees were employed for more than five years, and as such, their CBC’s were purged. In the third case, we provided the CBC by email to your office. Thus, this finding appears to in error.

6. It is stated that 3 of our volunteers had "some type of documentation" and 3 had "documentation exceptions." We were told in September that 4 of our volunteers had missing CBC’s. On September 22, 2021, we provided the Auditor’s Office with documentation showing that three volunteers were continually employed and their records purged since they were with us for more than five years. In the case of the fourth volunteer, we provided a copy of a clean background check by email to your office. Thus, there is no basis for this finding.

7. Under “Real-Time Start and End Date Tracking,” volunteers, contractors, and employees are not allowed to begin their positions until a clean criminal background check is received by the district. Thus, the data on start and end dates is irrelevant.

8. Among the recommendations in the report is to use the PHRST system to track non-employees. PHRST cannot be used for this purpose.
**Auditor Response**

OAOA thanks the school district for its ongoing cooperation and the thoughtful response to the performance audit. OAOA has considered each issue presented in management’s response and has made corrections to the final report where appropriate.

This office acknowledges that conducting a fully remote audit has its challenges. Auditors all over the world are conducting work remotely, and audit professional organizations have provided guidance in this specific area to ensure compliance with all professional standards. OAOA also partnered with a certified public accounting firm throughout the entire audit. The State also provided technology – Zoom, Teams, etc. – to allow for communications and exchange of information electronically. The pandemic extended the timeframe of this audit, as it has extended other state business activities.

OAOA’s objectives were limited to assessing the school district’s compliance with the Delaware Code, as well as evaluation of the control environment surrounding the Criminal Background Check (CBC) process. Our objectives did not include an audit of the entire hiring process or focus on finding any individuals who should have been disqualified. Adequate internal controls and written policies and procedures should ensure compliance and reduce the avenues through which an unacceptable hire might occur. Since 2015, the state adopted and follows the *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* (the Green Book), which is used across the United States to ensure strong internal control processes. OAOA used the Green Book as the criteria to evaluate the district’s internal controls.

This audit is based on samples taken from the populations of persons requiring CBCs in the school district. The employee population was extracted through the State of Delaware’s Payroll Human Resource Statewide Technology system and sampled. The populations of contractors, volunteers, and student teachers were provided by the school district and sampled by the Auditors from the populations provided by the district. The population of contractors, volunteers, and student teachers provided by the district have no single source system from which to extract them. The Auditors requested the documentary evidence relating to the CBCs for the samples, during the audit fieldwork and gave the district ample time to provide all pertinent information to the auditors. The OAOA then conducted an exit meeting, where all potential findings were identified and discussed with district management. The school district was then given additional ample time to provide further information. Auditors evaluated all documents and claims provided by the district, including claims of purged records, to finalize the report.

Although each district is subject to the same Delaware Code, each approached compliance using different methods, processes, internal controls and documentation. Further, the Delaware Code does not address every unique aspect of the CBC process or circumstance that may occur. For the key internal control – which is the suitability determination – districts employed different policies, procedures and internal controls. We considered each district’s approach and the evidence obtained across the 20 entities and found weaknesses in the internal control design and/or operational effectiveness, which puts students and others at risk of harm.

Compliance for contractors hired by the districts is an area that poses potentially serious risks. Because the school districts function as quasi-independent entities, but still under control of the state, and because the DOE is not responsible for coordinated oversight, some districts place the responsibility for ensuring a compliant CBC on contractors without employing additional risk mitigation measures for the district’s students. The Delaware Code requires districts to mitigate risk by completing suitability determinations on contractors following the completion of a compliant fingerprint SBI and FBI screening. A signed and approved suitability determination establishes the ultimate responsibility for the CBC process. The signing of a contract or MOU with the contractor is not a substitute for the suitability determination and does not alleviate the district’s responsibility for compliance and oversight.
Across the 20 entities, there were various interpretations of State law and regulations. There were two notable examples, one involving the Delaware Code and one involving the Delaware Administrative Code. Regarding the issue of aged or late receipt of CBC records, although Delaware Code is not specific about the length of time that a person may serve in a provisional status, legislators did not intend for districts to have a person in provisional status for an unlimited amount of time. It is the district’s responsibility to develop written processes and procedures to ensure that employees are not employed indefinitely without a CBC. As part of a strong internal control environment, the school district should be instituting appropriate follow-up processes for late CBCs. Also, regarding the overall CBC process, the Delaware Administrative Code Title 14 Section 745 provides only minimum guidelines for persons employed, who may have personal contact with students receiving care or education during the course of their assigned duties. The Delaware Administrative Code then leaves the establishment of specific procedures to the school districts. The school districts had varying levels of understanding of the requirement to supplement the minimum guidelines established in the Administrative Code.

In the auditor’s professional judgment, the exceptions referenced in this final report remain valid. We encourage the districts to evaluate shared technology systems which could help automate the management of the CBC process in one system for all employees and non-employees. We continue to encourage district management to consider all recommendations to improve internal controls to help ensure the safety of all district children.
Conclusion

CBCs are a critical control mechanism to prevent abuse or misconduct involving children within schools. Based on the results of the audit procedures performed, Delmar School District has established internal controls over the CBC process. However, we found weaknesses in the control design and in the operating effectiveness of the controls, as documented in this report. This report makes recommendations that are intended to strengthen the internal controls and accountability for the CBC compliance process to ultimately help protect the district and the children it educates from being victims of bad actors.